Includes the essay What I Believe
What I Believe was published by Kegan Paul in 1925.
The Warbler Classics edition (2023) contains the following note:
"Why I am not a Christian" was a lecture delivered at Battersea Town Hall on March 6, 1927, under the auspices of the South London Branch of the National Secular Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Atheism, New York.The code R.WNC denotes the specific book (Why I am not a Christian) to which notes apply. The numbers at the left represent the page numbers for the particular edition. A page number may be followed by a letter, which indicates the paragraph. Even when a paragraph continues from the preceding page, it is marked as a. When a negative sign precedes the letter, the reader is expected to count paragraphs from the bottom of the page. That is, -a and -b mean the first and second paragraphs upward from the bottom.
Occasionally will appear a random three-letter string plus number. This tells me that some note extends over several pages. If necessary I can refer back to the paper trail.
An arrow near a number, as in 32<-- says the note refers back before and including the page number. A double arrow, as in 51<-->, says the note refers to a block of text beginning and ending around the page number.
Exclamation points next to the page number or label indicate my assessment of the note's importance, rated from 1 to 5 bang marks. Question marks indicate the possibility of error on my part.
R.WNC
Note marked MBR1 is missing.
MBR2
Russell's rejection of the existence of spirits also is behind his acceptance of Mills' First Cause dismissal: What caused God? What came before God? We also see that both held a Newtonian-style view of linear time. I daresay Russell, tho a mathematician as well as a logician, was not terribly familiar with topologies that make time effectively non-linear -- tho in the 1920s he wrote a primer on Einstein's special theory of relativity.
It was his collaborator Whitehead who persuaded Russell to turn to a more holistic, monistic view of the universe on account of the revolutionary impact of the general theory of relativity. It is perhaps possible that, when he delievered the lecture, Russell's thinking hadn't quite got there. Tho he accepted Mills' argument some years before Einstein's 1905 breakthru, it is mildly surprising that that argument was not brushed off by 1927 as probably irrelevant. That is, plainly GR doesn't by itself prove God's existence. But Mills' argument falls as soon as one considers a Riemannian universe -- which is exactly what Einstein came up with.
A Spinoza-style pseudo-theist (G.O.D. = Great Out Doors), Einstein once termed linear time an illusion.
In a letter Einstein wrote,
Now he has departed from this strange world a little ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.Further, we remark that Russell does not even bother much with Aristotle's prime mover argument, which doesn't actually fit Mills' argument. That is, Aristotle realized that the concept of time and of a sequence of events requires a timeless supervening force that could not be of this world. That's not a trivial argument. Logician Russell however would not admit anything beyond the universe of direct causes and effects, regardless of the logic favoring some sort of framework. How, for example, is general relativity to be viewed other than as asserting an almost metaphysical spacetime block?
Russell did not mention that the Catholic Church's acceptance of the first cause argument (1927) is based on Aristotle's logic, who should be credited as the first writer to make a strong intellectual case for the existence of a monotheistic God, which other Greeks interpreted as the First Principle, or Logos. Perhaps Heraclitus would have appealed more to Russell -- especially in his neutral monism phase -- than Aristotle.
Herewith are Perplexity notes on Aristotle:
Aristotle's metaphysics, often called "first philosophy," seeks to understand the fundamental nature of reality by studying "being qua being"—the essence and principles of existence itself. Key concepts include:+++++
# The Four Causes:Aristotle explains change and existence through four types of causes:# Substance and Being: Central to his metaphysics is the study of "substance" (ousia), which underpins all other categories like quality or quantity. Substance is primary in understanding what it means to exist
Material Cause: The substance something is made of.
Formal Cause: The structure or design of a thing.
Efficient Cause: The agent or process that brings something into being.
Final Cause: The purpose or goal for which something exists
# The Unmoved Mover: Aristotle posits a "pure actuality" or "unmoved mover" as the ultimate cause of motion and change in the universe. This entity is the goal toward which all things strive, representing pure thought and eternal existence
# Principle of Non-Contradiction: A foundational axiom in his metaphysics states that contradictory statements cannot both be true simultaneously, ensuring logical coherence in understanding reality
Aristotle's metaphysics integrates causality, purpose, and logic, offering a framework to explore existence beyond the physical world.
+++++
In Aristotle's philosophy, nature (physis) refers to the intrinsic principle of motion, change, and rest within natural beings. It is the essence or form that gives entities their ability to develop and function according to their own inherent tendencies, as opposed to external forces or human artifice. Key aspects of his conception include:
Nature as an Inner Principle: Nature is the internal source of movement and rest in natural substances, distinguishing them from artificial objects, which rely on external causes for change (e.g., a tree grows naturally, while a bed requires human craftsmanship)
Form Over Matter: While matter provides the potential for change, Aristotle emphasizes that nature primarily resides in the form or essence of a thing—its defining characteristics that guide its development and purpose
Contrast with Art and Convention: Natural things act according to their innate principles, whereas artifacts are shaped by external design. Similarly, Aristotle contrasts what is "by nature" with what is "by convention," highlighting universal principles over human customs
Connection to Motion and Change: Nature encompasses processes like generation, growth, and decay, which occur within living beings and natural elements due to their internal principles
Thus, for Aristotle, nature is both the cause and goal of a being's existence and activity, rooted in its essence and realized through its inherent potential.
PDK1
10. Re the argument for God's existence from design:
Russell now brings up the belief of scientists in the eventual extinction of life on earth as being a depressing scenario. Yet he doesn't -- and admittedly it would have been a difficult subject for a popular lecture, go into the issue of entropy, which is a very subtle subject and introduces many questions into the "consensus" scientific view. The subject certainly draws us back to the extreme mystery of time. The "law" of entropy makes comprehension of "Eistein time" very difficult, and vice versa. And the quantum interpretation puzzle makes time, history and entropy an impossible labyrinth. Now, it may be that Russell was not fully aware of such subtleties, but neither was he wholly ignorant of them. Hence, I must regard the basis of his point as being weak.
Still, Russell was attempting to answer the claim that without God, life is pointless. It appears he is adroitly sidestepping that argument with his one example of "godless" futility. That is, he has used a particular, with the easy rebuttal that no one really cares about the far future, to dismiss a far more general claim, which he has not properly analyzed at all.
PDK2
Russell seems unaware that atheism, in league with Darwinism, implies the destruction of the basis of morality. Yet, in 1948 in a radio debate with Copleston, he asserted that Moore, in Principia Ethica, had answered this objection. (I am reading Moore's book and already question Moore's attempt to relegate the concept of good to that of one of the qualia, such as yellow.) After all, Russell regards himself as highly moral, tho his morality was humanistic rather than Christian, leading him into all sorts of serial marital difficulties. Still, in his History of Western Philosophy (1945), he chastised Nietzsche for his amoral stance and advocated a world flowing with universal love.
Of course, some of Russell's critics charge that he did not properly understand Nietzsche, a brilliant man who did understand that the absence of God leaves a void in the basis of moral values ("nihilism"). Yet, it was Nietzsche's apparent solutions to this problem (never fully explicated), that drew the scorn of Russell and others.
10 -a. Now however we pick up the "moral arguments for the deity." Russell addresses the morality issue by attacking Kant's argument, a form of which is to say that there would be no right or wrong unless God exists (see above). In that case, for God there is no right or wrong. This whole area of thought is of course quite subtle and cannot be dismissed in a paragraph or two (even tho it is clear that the lecture format makes for tight constraints). At the least, Russell ought to have addressed why the knowledge of good and evil was so noxious for humanity.
11. There is much to say for Russell's humorous presentation -- tho he does not say it -- of the Gnostic argument that the devil made the world when God was not looking. Here one might mention that in Christian (prior to Gnosticism), the devil is the god of the fallen world, the ruler of "the air," whose power was taken from him on the cross. Tho the fallen world continues to exist, Christ's power continually works to defeat Satan on behalf of those who follow him or those whom he seeks out.
Such theological matters are important if Russell is to successfully challenge Christianity. The point here is that Russell does not examine very much that is essential to Christian thought. In fact, it appears he is anxious to skewer the cartoon version of Christianity that is so popular among those who profess Christ in name only.
John 3.3 quotes Jesus as telling Nicodemus: "Here is the truth. Unless a person is born from above [or again], he cannot see God's kingdom."
To Russell, God's kingdom is invisible. He could not sense God's presence directly nor detect God in the marvelous natural works about him. Unwittingly, this blind man was leading the blind into the pit, all the while having a compassionate regard for his fellow humans. This problem remains today for advocates and joiners of all stripes. This rather kindly gentleman epitomized the phrase: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions."
12. The argument for the remedying of injustice is Russell's title of the subsection on this page.
Russell's response: "If there is injustice in our area of the universe, why should we think that somewhere somewhen in the universe, there is a region where all is just?"
I do not know that he has fairly represented the argument that divine justice is needed to argue? that overall there is no injustice in God's universe (i.e., from some cosmic vantage point, God sees no injustice, tho from another he may).
Firstly, the nihilism that follows from atheistic Darwinism virtually guarantees that injustice is the lot of living creatures; in that respect injustice is a mere subjective human impression. The fallen world certainly reflects such social Darwinism, and always has, from well before Darwin.
Yet, Christian doctrine teaches that no weapon fashioned against Jesus, or his followers, will prosper (despite temporary setbacks). It can take long periods of discipleship before that point sinks in.
13. The character of Christ is the subsection on this page.
Most professing Christians do not take all Christ's teachings literally -- as in "turn the other cheek," which he says that Buddha and Lao Tzu taught before Christ. There is of course no requirement that every one of Christ's teachings be an original thought, tho Jesus didn't utter his sayings in isolation from his overall theological framework. And, we add, that a Christian would perhaps claim that such teachings came from the pre-incarnate Son of God.
In any case, among many New Testament Christians, the saying is taken very seriously. I would say Russell studiously ignores the difference between a true disciple and a nominal Christian.
Russell cites the teaching "Judge not, lest ye be judged," and contrasts that with the fact that Christians serve as judges in law courts. Jesus was talking about holding another person in disdain for specific behaviors, real or imagined, not about a fact-finding process. Compassion, even for very degraded persons, is Christ's way. You may not like them, but you can extend God's love toward them.
Also, born-again Christians are free to choose whether they should serve in secular courts. Certainly the Bible frowns on Christians suing each other. Why have persons without the Spirit decide what's right among those who have the Spirit? (I Cor. 6. 1-8) But even here, modern society creates technical situations whereby such suits are impossible to avoid.
+++++
It is interesting that Russell contrasts his philosophical value system with that of Nietzsche, who espoused many values at odds with those of Christianity. Contrary to Nietzsche, Russell says in his History of Western Philosophy, Russell advocates universal love among humans. But absent a God, why bother? Even tho some Vedic teachers, such as Buddha, promoted this concept before Christ, one can perhaps discern the notion of a "universal christological principle" at work since the dawn of what Karl Jaspers dubbed "the Axial Age."
Russell in fact did realize that those who promoted holistic systems of the cosmos (monists) usually had a (possibly hidden) theist agenda. Similarly Nietzsche battled such systematizing probably because he saw that such systems pointed to a God, if not a "universal christological principle."
Tho Russell's History, 1945, appeared much later than Why, 1925, his other writings and conduct reflect that such a "Christian" view was ingrained deeply in him. And it is surely correct that he tried hard to do better than lip service on behalf of his personal set of morals, which is more than can be said for many nominal Christians. But again, a nominal Christian is probably not a Christian, in the New Testament sense of that term. The NT uses the term disciple, or student, meaning someone who is a doer of the word, and not a hearer only. The reverse holds for the nominal Christian. +++++
MTK
No comments:
Post a Comment